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An "Exclusive" Application of an Abstract Idea: 
Clarification of Patent-Eligible Subject Matter After 
Bilski v. Kappos 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, a patent application is examined to 
determine whether the invention claimed in the application is novel 
under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and not obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 
bcf(>re a patent is issued f(>r the invention. Prior to an extensive 
examination of a patent application under these provisions, an 
invention must pass the threshold requirement 1 of patent eligibility 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.2 Section 101 states that if an invention is a 
"new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter," the invention may be considered t(x patenting in light of 
the other provisions of the Patent Act. 3 The categories of subject 
matter eligible f(>r patenting arc broad;4 however, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has established three exceptions to patent eligibility under 
§ l 0 l: "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas."5 
The "abstract idea" exception has been used and analyzed by the 
Supreme Court several times,6 but the Court has never precisely 
established a ddlnition or a reasoned foundation for the "abstract 
idea" exception. 
Recently, the Supreme Court reexamined the patent eligibility 
inquiry of § l 0 l, and the "abstract idea" exception, in Bilski v. 
Kappos? The Bilski Court held that the Federal Circuit's "machine-
or- transf(mnation" test is not the sole test f(>r the patent eligibility of 
I. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 ( 1978); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 973 
(Fed. Cir. 2009); In rc Bilski, 545 F.3d 943,950 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
2. In the text bdow, sections of 35 U.S. C. will be rdcrred to by section number only. 
3. 35 U.S C.§ 101. 
4. Sec, c,q., Research Corp. Tech. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 867 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
5. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (20 I) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 309 ( 1980)). 
6. Sa, e,q., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 ( 1981 ); Hook, 437 U.S. 584; Gottschalk 
v. Benson,409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
7. 130S.Ct.3218. 
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processes, overruling the decision bclow.x Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court found that the invention in the patent application at issue was 
an unpatentable "abstract idea" by comparing it with the inventions 
in its previous decisions in Gottschalk v. Benson,'! Parker v. Flook, 10 
and Diamond v. Diehr. 11 Unfcxtunatcly, the Court in Bilski leaves 
many questions unanswered, including: What is an abstract idea? 
Why is an abstract idea an exception to patentable subject matter? 
What is the basis f()r concluding that an invention is an abstract idea? 
How is a patent applicant to know if an invention is an abstract idea? 
What would a patentable process look like that fails the "machinc-or-
transf()rmation" test? 
The Supreme Court and other courts have never definitively 
explained what an "abstract idea" is or why it should be an exception 
to patent-eligible subject matter, although they often conclude that 
inventions arc unpatentable because they constitute abstract ideas. 
frequently, including in Bilski, courts confuse the subject matter 
eligibility analysis of 35 U .S.C. § l 0 l with the novelty analysis of 35 
U .S.C. § 102. 12 The Bilski analysis merely compares the invention at 
issue with other inventions in precedent, such as those in Benson, 
Flook, and Diehr. 13 This analysis can easily be manipulated by patent 
applicants, examiners, and judges to conform to their preconceived 
notions of whether an invention is patentable. Thus, the resultant 
test for the patentability of subject matter, particularly where 
processes are involved, is no better than a "you know it when you 
sec it" test. 
To resolve at least some of these problems, courts and patent 
practitioners should not look at "abstract idea" as a judicially 
imposed exception to eligible subject matter under§ l 0 l; rather, the 
concept of "abstract idea" should be seen as a tool the courts use to 
apply the statutory text to a process claim. In simple terms, "abstract 
idea" should not be considered an exception to the text of § l 01, 
but a result ofthc text of§ 101. Analyzing "abstract idea" as a tool 
ll. In u Bilski, 545 !'.3d 943 (Fed. C:ir. 2008). The "Imchinc-or-transt(>nnation" test 
is restated infra in text accompanying note 138. 
9. 409 U.S. 63. 
10. 437 U.S. 584. 
II. 450 U.S. 175. 
12. Cf llil.>'ki, 130 S. Ct. at 3231; Diamond v. C:hakrabartv, 447 U.S. 303,309 ( 1980); 
Ultramcrcial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 2010 WL 3360098, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
13. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 323!. 
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for interpreting the text of § I 0 I, rather than an exception to it, 
would answer questions left by years of precedent, add strength and 
understanding to the Court's conclusory holdings that certain 
inventions arc merely abstract ideas, provide clarity to a ditlicult legal 
analysis, and supply guidance to patent applicants who arc 
considering the patentability of inventions. 
This Comment analyzes the historical origins and modern 
interpretation of eligible subject matter under § 101 and the so-
called "abstract idea" exception. Concerns with the current 
understanding of eligible subject matter and its exceptions arc 
addressed. Because the Supreme Court has denied bright-line rules 
for patent cligibility/4 it may be impossible to answer all the 
questions in this realm with perfect clarity. However, a clearer 
method of judicial application of "abstract idea" is proposed in this 
Comment to resolve at least some of the concerns listed above. 
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES PATENT LAW 
A. Constitutional Basis for Patents in the U.S. 
The Constitution states that Congress has the power "[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discovcrics." 15 The patent system 
"promote[sJ the Progress of Science and useful Arts," 16 or 
encourages innovation, by offering a monopoly for a limited period 
of time to an inventor who comes up with something new and 
useful. 17 In exchange for the monopoly, the inventor publicly 
discloses the invention so that others may freely build, improve, sell, 
or otherwise usc the invention once the inventor's period of 
exclusivity has expircd. 1x Thus, the ultimate goal of the patent system 
is to encourage public disclosure of inventions and to stimulate 
innovation for society as a whole. 
14. See, c.cq., id. at 3226-27. 
IS. U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. 
16. !d. 
17. Currently, the time of exclusivity granted to the patentee ti>r utility patents is 
generally twenty years trom the time of tiling a patent application. 35 U.S.C. § !54 (2006 ). 
18. EF, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 4!6 U.S. 470, 480-8! (!974). 
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B. Introduction to Eligible Subject Matter 
In order for an invention to quality f()r patent protection, it must 
meet some basic requirements. First, and bd()rc other questions of 
patentability arc examined, the invention must constitute subject 
matter that Congress intended to be eligible f()r patcnting. 1') This 
threshold rcquircmcnt20 f()r patentable subject matter is codified in 
§ 10 I, reproduced here in its entirety: "Whoever invents or discovers 
any new and useful process, machine, nunuf:1Cturc, or composition 
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof~ may obtain a 
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title. " 21 In other words, if an invention or idea docs not E1ll within 
one of the four enumerated categories of process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, a patent will not be granted 
to the inventor for the invention. If an invention docs fall within one 
of these categories, which arc defined by statutory and common 
law ,22 then the invention is deemed to constitute eligible subject 
matter and must then be examined under other patentability 
standards, such as novelty and obviousncss. 23 The most difficult of 
the f(mr categories to ddinc, and the subject of much litigation, is 
"process. "24 
19. See UNITED STATES PATENT AN!l TRADEMARK OI·HCE, MANUAl. 01' PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 2106-16, 8th ed. 2010 rherein;lfter M.P.E.l'.], al'ailtrble at 
http:/ /www.uspto.gov /web/<>Hices/pac/mpep/mpep_e8r6_21 OO.pdf. 
20. Parker v. Hook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967,973 
(Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
21. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Judge Rich ofthe Federal Circuit's predecessor court, the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.), has noted that§ 101 's reference to "new" 
means nothing more than "novel" under§ 102 and "nonobvious" under§ 103, explaining 
that "l tjo provide the option of making such a rejection under either § I 0 I or § I 02 is 
confusing and therdi>re bad law. 'The word "new" in § I 0 I is ddined and is to be 
construed in accordance with the provisions of§ I 02."' Iu re lkrgy, 596 F.2d 952, 960-61 
(C.C.l'.A. 1979) (citing In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401 (C.C.l'.A. 1970)). 
22. The common law carves out sever,\! exceptions to this general statement, as will be 
discussed later. 
23. "Eligible subject matter" is also retern:d to as "statutory subject matter" or 
"patentable subject matter." See, t-B., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3248 (2010); In re 
Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 973. 
24. See, CJf., Flook, 437 U.S. at 589 ("The line between a patent,lblc 'process' and an 
unpatentable 'principle' is not always clear. Roth are 'conception[ s [ of the mind, seen only lw 
r their I effects when being executed or perlimned. "' (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 u.S. 
707, 728 (1880)); See also Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364, at *2, *6 
(B.P.A.I. Mar. 8, 2006) ("'[N]on-machinc-implcmented' methods, because of their abstract 
nature, present§ 101 issues." "A 'process' is the most difticult category of§ 101 to ddine."). 
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A patentable "process" is ddlned in § I OO(b) as "process, art or 
method, and includes a new usc of a known process, machine, 
manufacture, composition of matter, or material."25 As can be readily 
observed, the ddlnition is circular, using the term "process" to 
ddlnc itself.26 Thus, when courts or other players in patent practice 
deal with process inventions, an appeal to the plain language of the 
statute is not particularly helpful in determining patent eligibility 
under § 1 0 I . 
for a proper understanding of eligible subject matter and its 
exceptions, it is necessary to review case law dealing with the topic. 
further insight into how courts have defined eligible subject matter 
will be described later as a major portion of this Comment. 
C. Introduction to Major ProJlisions of the Patent Act 
Because this Comment discusses the interplay between the 
threshold question of § I 0 I and concepts of novelty and 
obviousness, a brief overview of these concepts is also necessary. A 
patentable invention must be novel, or, in other words, ncw. 27 
Claims in a patent application that define the scope of the invention 
for which an applicant wishes to receive a patent are most often 
rejected under § 102 if a single publication or embodiment that 
qualifies as "prior art"2x describes each and every element of the 
invention as set t(xth in the claim. 2'~ Stated another way, § I 02 seeks 
to bar a patent if the inventor was not the true first inventor, by 
comparing the invention to the prior art. 30 If the invention is in the 
25. 35 U.S.C. § IOO(b) (2006). 
26. Rilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3237 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T]his definition is not 
especially helpful, given that it also uses the term 'process' and is therd(m: somewhat 
circular."). 
27. 35 U .S.C. § I 02 sets forth the standards by which the novelty of an invention is 
cx.1mined. 
28. "Prior art" generally includes "the knowledge, usage, patents, and descriptions 
relating to an invention in existence bd(>re the invention." 60 AM. JUR. 2n Patents§ 93 
(2010); ser also Kimberly-Cbrk Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 l:-'.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed Cir. 
1984) (defining prior art as the "knowledge that is available, including what would be obvious 
from it, at a given time, to .1 person of ordinary skill in an art"); Mohasco Indus., Inc. v. E. T. 
Barwick Mills, Inc., 221 f. Supp. 191 (N.D. <_;a. 1963); 60 AM. JUR. 2n l'atent.r § 178 
(2010). 
29. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 
1987); .ree al.ro M.P.E.P., .rupra note 19, § 2131. 
30. The U.S. patent system is a hybrid "first to invent/first to tile" system, whereas 
other countries take <1 "tirst to tile" appro<1ch. See Alexander Poltorak, Fir.rt-to-File J'J. First-to-
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prior art, then the applicant is not entitled to the exclusive rights of a 
patent because the applicant was not the first one to come up with 
the invention. Therefore, even if an invention qualities as eligible 
subject matter under § 101, it will not be patentable under § 102 if 
it is not new. 
An invention worthy of a patent also must not be obvious to "a 
person having ordinary skill in the art. "' 1 An invention that is not 
found exactly in the prior art may still be barred from patenting 
under § 103 if the invention would have been obvious to one of skill 
in the art at the time of the invention. Typically, claims arc rejected 
under § 103 if there is a primary publication that describes a portion 
of the claimed invention and other publication(s) or the knowledge 
and capabilities of those working in the field provide the clements of 
the invention that arc missing in the primary reference . .l2 A patent on 
the invention will not be allowed if one of ordinary skill in the art 
would have found it obvious to combine the clements found in the 
prior art in the way that is claimed in the patent application."" 
In sum, the novelty and obviousness inquiries of§§ 102 and 103 
are further gatekeepers (beyond § 101) that preclude applicants from 
obtaining patents for inventions that were previously described or 
accomplished or are close enough to have been obvious. Thcrcf()re, 
an invention that is deemed to constitute eligible subject matter 
under§ 101 still has to overcome other, often more diftlcult, hurdles 
before a patent can be obtained. 
Another common bar to patentability in the Patent Act is§ ll2. 
Provisions of this section require clarity and exactness in the parts of 
the patent application that explain the invention (the "specification") 
and in the claims themselves. 34 for instance, the spccitlcation must 
include "a written description of the invention, and of the manner 
and process of making and using [the invention], in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art ... 
to make and usc the same. " 35 These requirements arc in place to 
lm>ent, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY (Apr. 2010), http:/ /www.iptod.ly.com/artides/ 
2008-4-polt< >rak.asp. 
31. 35 U.S.C. § 103 sets t<>rth the standards by which the nonolwiousness of an 
in\'cntion is exan1ined. 
32. Sec M.P.E.P., mpra note 19, § 706.02(j), (m). 
33. See KSR. lnt'l Co. v. Teletlex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); Graham v. john Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. I ( 1966 ); M.P.E.P., mpra note 19, § 2141. 
34. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (especially the first and second parag;raphs). 
35. ld. 
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induce the person receiving the patent to disclose the invention fully 
and enable those in the particular technological tlcld to carry out the 
invention. Thus, the patent system's purposes of disclosure and 
promoting innovation are served by the requirements of§ 112.36 
Ill. A HISTORICAL UNDEI"'>TANDING CW PATENT-ELIGIBLE 
SUBJECT MATTER 
Courts have generally f()Und three major categories of 
inventions37 that arc not eligible f(>r patents. 3x The courts generally 
refer to these categories as "exceptions" to § 10 l. 3~ These exceptions 
arc "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. "40 Each 
exception is sometimes referred to by different terms,41 but the 
origin of these judicially created exceptions goes back over 150 
years. 42 For example, early cases that provide support for the 
"abstract idea" exception include LeRoy v. Tatham43 and CYReilly v. 
Morse. 44 The exceptions have been reatlirmed and relied upon by the 
U.S. Supreme Court many times in the years since the early cases.45 
36. Sec Honeywell lnt'l Inc. v. U.S., 81 Fed. Cl. 514, 567-68 (2008), rev'd on other 
,wounds, 609 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
37. A t(nJrth, not discussed in this Comment, is printed matter. See, e.g., In re Miller, 
418 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In 1·e jones, 373 F.2d 1007 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Ex parte 
Gwinn, 112 U.S.P.Q. 439, 19S5 WI. 5739 (R.P.A.I. 1955); see also M.l'.E.l'., supra note 19, 
§ 706.03(a). This exception is usually lett otf the list by courts unless the invention at issue 
covers printed mattn. 
38. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (20 I 0) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303, 308 (I 980) ). 
39. These categories are n.:fern.:d to here as ~'exceptions,'' as the tenn is used in courts 
and as generally understood. Later, this Comment challenges the characterization of these 
categories as exceptions to 35 U .S.C. § I 0 I, and suggests that the categories should be seen as 
merely ,1 tool t(,r interpreting the text of the statute rather than exceptions to the statutory 
text. Sec infra Part VI. 
40. Ri!Jki, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309). 
41. Sec, c._q., Cottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (using the terms 
"\ p 1hcnomena of nature," "mental processes," and "abstract intellectual concepts" as examples 
of unpatentable inventions); Tilghman \'. Proctor, I 02 U.S. 707, 728 ( 1880) (stating that 
"principles" arc unpatentable). 
42. Sec O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853); Lc Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 
(14How.) 156(1852). 
43. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156. 
44. 56LJ.S.(J5How.)62. 
45. E<q., Rilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225-26; Chakrabar~v, 447 U.S. at 309 (citing Parker v. 
Flook, 427 U.S. 584,588-89 (1978); Renson, 409 U.S. at 67; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 ( 1948); O'Reilly, 56 U.S. ( 15. How.) at 112-121; LeRoy, 
55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175). 
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Many of these opinions, however, appear to confuse issues of 
eligibility under § 101 with concepts of novelty under § l 02.46 
furthermore, no Supreme Court opinion appears to provide detailed 
justification tor the existence of the "abstract idea" exception. 
A. Early Supreme Court Cases 
In Le Roy, the Court was presented with an invention covering a 
new method f()r manufacturing lead pipes using a certain 
combination of machinery parts.47 The lower court had instructed 
the jury that the invention "did not consist in the novelty of the 
machinery, but in bringing a newly discovered principle into practical 
application."4R On review, the Supreme Court noted that "[i]t is 
admitted that a principle is not patentable. A principle, in the 
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these 
cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an 
exclusive right. "49 The opinion also stated that 
[a] patent will be good, though the subject of the patent 
consists in the discovery of a great, general, and most 
comprehensive principle in science or law of nature, if that 
principle is by the specification applied to any special 
purpose, so as thereby to cflCctuate a practical result and 
bendi.t not previously attained.so 
Thus, Le Roy shows that a "principle" by itself is not patentable, 
although a practical application of a principle may be patentable. 
In ()>Reilly v. Morse, the Court upheld the patentability of 
46. See, C.Jf., Rilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231; Chakrabar~y, 447 U.S. at 309; Ultramcrcial, 
LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 2010 WL 336009R, at *6 (C. D. Cal. 2010). 
47. LeRoy, 55 U.S. ( 14 How.) at 172. 
4R. !d. at 156,160, 174 (quoting). 
49. !d. at 174-175. 
50. !d. at 175 (quoting Househill Coal and Iron Co. v. Neilson [1X43[, X Eng. Rep. 
616). At the time, the specification could be used to ddinc the invention. Today, the claim 
ddincs the invention. In current practice, to be so limited, the claim itself would have to apply 
the principle to a specified purpose. It is not clear what "specific purpose" or what level of 
application qualities a claim involving a principle ti>r patent eligibility. In Ililski, the applicant 
argued that the method of hedging was patentable because it was applied to a particular 
industry to solve a practical problem; this did not persuade the Court that the claim covered 
eligible subject matter. Rilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3220-21. 
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Morse's t:m1ous electro-magnetic telegraph. 51 However, aside from 
the specific usc of the telegraph contemplated by Morse's 
specification, Morse also tried to claim "electro-magnetism, however 
developed f(x marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or 
letters, at any distances, being a new application of that power of 
which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer. " 52 This claim was 
held to be unpatentable because 
it matters not by what process or machinery the result is 
accomplished .... New discoveries in physical science may 
enable him to combine [his invention] with new agents and 
new elements, and by that means attain the object in a 
manner superior to the present process and altogether 
ditl-crent from it. 53 
The Court further reasoned that allowing Morse to receive a patent 
on this claim would not be fair because Morse could "secure the 
exclusive usc by his present patent [and] vary it with every new 
discovery and development of the science, and need place no 
description of the new manner, process, or machinery, upon the 
records of the patent oflice. " 54 Consequently, Morse "claims an 
exclusive right to usc a manner and process which he has not 
described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not 
describe when he obtained his patent." 55 The Court reached this 
conclusion despite the tact that Morse had arguably limited his claim 
to a "special purposc,"56 i.e., "f(x marking or printing intelligible 
characters. " 57 
The (YReilly Court compared the claim at issue to one f(>r which 
a patent was granted in England5x in Neilson v. Harford. 59 The 
Neilson patent involved the principle that hot air was more cflicicnt 
51. O'Reilly v. Morse:, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, at 111-12 (1853). 
52. !d . . n 112. 
53. !d. at 113. 
54. !d. 
55. !d. The inadequate description would likely bar the patent today under 35 U.S.C. § 
112 (2006) 
56. LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852). 
57. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. ( 15 How.) at 86. 
58. /d.atll4-!5. 
59. II84!J !51 Eng. Rep. 1256 (K.R.). 
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than cold air "in fires, forges, and fiwnaces, where a blowing 
apparatus is required. " 60 The English court found that the claim 
constituted eligible subject matter because it covered an application 
of the principle, rather than the principle itself 61 In discussing the 
English case, the CYReilly Court stated: 
[I ]t seems that the court at tlrst doubted, whether it was a 
patent for any thing more than the discovery that hot air 
would promote the ignition of fuel better than cold. And if 
this had been the construction, the court, it appears, would 
have held his patent to be void; because the discovery of a 
principle in natural philosophy or physical science, is not 
patentable. 
But after much consideration, it was finally decided that 
this principle must be regarded as well known, and that the 
plaintiff had invented a mechanical mode of applying it to 
furnaces .... 62 
The O)Reilly case is one of the first U.S. cases to establish the 
fact that a principle (or abstract idea) alone is not eligible subject 
matter for patenting under the later-enacted § l 0 l. 6 ' However, the 
CYReilly Court did not explain why a principle "is not patentable. " 64 
A case often cited as standing f(x the proposition that abstract 
ideas are not patentablc65 is Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard. 66 This 
case involved a patent claim for the idea of an eraser placed on the 
end of a pencil.67 Therefore, the claim was drawn to an article of 
60. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 114-IS. 
61. Id. at liS-16. 
62. Id. at 116. 
63. Rut see In re Bilski, S4S F.3d 943, 983-84,995-96 (h.:Ll. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that O'Reilly v. Morse should be analogous to the modern-day 35 U.S.C:. 
§ 112 rather than 35 U.S. C.§ 101 ). 
64. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. (IS How.) at 116. Rut see Lc Roy v. Tatham, SS U.S. ( 14 How.) 
156, 174-75 (giving a basic, though unsatisEKtory, explanation li>r why ,l "principle" is not 
patentable). 
65. Sec, c...q., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,67 (1972) (citing Rubbn-Tip Pencil 
Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874)) (discussed in Part III.B infra); In re 
Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 978 (Feel. Cir. 2009). 
66. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498. 
67. Id. 
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man uf:Kturc rather than a process. After discounting elements of the 
invention that were known, the Court held that the claim was 
ineligible t()r patcnting.6x It rhetorically questioned, "What, 
thcrcf()re, is lett f()r this patentee but the idea that if a pencil is 
inserted into a cavity in a piece of rubber smaller than itself the 
rubber will attach itself to the pencil, and when so attached become 
convenient t()r usc as an crascr?"6<J While the Court thought the idea 
was a good one, it concluded that "[a]n idea of itself is not 
patentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically 
useful is. " 70 It is not clear how this holding properly relates to a 
process claim, but courts frequently cite Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. for 
the general proposition that abstract ideas are not patentable, 
regardless of the statutory class. 71 
B. Modern Supreme Court Cases 
More recently, the Supreme Court has continued to endorse the 
exceptions to patentable subject matter. In 1948, the Court 
reviewed a patent on a group of bacteria used to help the growth of 
leguminous plants in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.72 The 
Court noted that "patents cannot issue f()r the discovery of the 
phenomena of nature. " 73 Although Funk Bros. involved a 
phenomenon of nature rather than an abstract idea, it is helpful to 
discuss all the so-called exceptions to eligible subject matter to gain a 
better understanding of why "abstract idea" is itself an exception. In 
its explanation f(x why natural phenomena arc not patentable, the 
Funk Bros. Court stated: 
The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, 
electricity, or the qualities of metals, arc part of the 
storehouse of knowledge of all men. They arc manifestations 
of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
68. !d. at 507. 
69. !d. (emphasis added). 
70. !d. 
71. See, eB., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64, 67 (1972) (involving a process 
claim); h1 rc Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 970, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (involving a method or 
process claim). 
72. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
73. !d. at 130 (citing LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852)). 
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none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of 
nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law 
recognizes. 1f there is to be invention from such a discovery, 
it must come from the application of the law of nature to a 
new and usdi.1l cnd. 74 
Although the Court did not explain why these qualities "arc part 
of the storehouse of knowledge of all men" and arc "reserved 
exclusively to none," it did assert that it would deny a patent f(x the 
person who discovers the qualities f(x the first time. 
A different court's analysis protlercd almost sixty years later 
attempted to explain why natural phenomena and laws of nature 
constitute ineligible subject matter under§ 101. In Ex parte Bilski, 
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) opined that 
"[ t ]he terms 'invents' and 'discovers' in § 101 arc interpreted to 
require 'invention,' which is the conception and production of 
something that did not before exist, as opposed to 'discovery,' which 
is to bring to light that which existed before, but which was not 
known."75 Under this reasoning, the ineligibility of natural 
phenomena and laws of nature is merely a result of interpreting the 
phrase "invents or discovers" from the text of§ 101. However, this 
analysis appears to read "or discovers" out of the statute. Indeed, 
this analysis appears to alter the very definition of the term 
"invention" set f(xth in § 100: "invention means invention or 
discovery." 
One way to interpret § l 01 without reading the term 
"discovery" out of the text of the statute is to f(Kus on the word 
"new." The statute allows anyone who "invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" 
to receive a patent. 76 A natural phenomenon or a law of nature 
cannot be "new" because, by definition, it has always existed. 
74. Id. (citing Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. R.1dio Corp., .306 U.S. R6, 94 ( 19.39); 
DeForest Radio Co. v. <_;en. Eke. Co., 28.3 U.S. 664, 684-SS ( 19.31 ); Tel. Cases, 126 U.S. I, 
S.32-33 ( 1888); Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Viii. of Saratoga Springs, I S9 F 4S.3, 462-63 
(1908)). 
7S. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257,2006 WL S738364, at *S (B.P.A.I. Mar. R, 2006) 
(citing Ex parte Lundgren, No. 200.3-2088, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 13H5, 1396 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 20, 
2004)). The Board did not refer to the Funk Rros. case in Ex parte llilski, but the analysis tits 
well with the statement of Funk Rros. quoted herein. See supra text accompanying note 74. 
76 . .35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added). 
1234 
I223 An ((Exclusive" Application of an Abstract Idea 
Therefore, even if someone discovers the natural phenomenon or law 
of nature for the first time, the person did not discover something 
"new" and the discovery should not be eligible f(>r patenting under 
§ IOI. However, an approach that denies a patent under § 101 
because the subject matter is not "new" has been criticized by J udgc 
Rich of the federal Circuit's predecessor court, the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals, in In re Bergy.77 In that case, Judge 
Rich opined that § l 0 l 's use of the word "new" means nothing 
more than "novel" under § 102 and "nonobvious" under § 103. 7x 
Thercf(xe, in Judge Rich's view, if something is not patent eligible 
because it is not "new," it should be rejected under § 102, not 
categorically under § l 0 I _7~ 
Presumably, under Judge Rich's approach, it would be prudent 
to let claims covering any of the four statutory categories pass the 
§ I 01 bar, even those covering natural phenomena or laws of nature, 
but then preliminarily reject the claims under § I 02. The best 
statutory candidate f(>r denying these claims that cover these 
categories under § 102 is likely subsection (f). This provision recites: 
"A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (f) he did not 
himself invent the su bjcct matter sought to be patented .... ,xo 
Again, determining what the terms of § l02(f) mean requires 
looking back to§ IOO, which states, "'[I]nvcntion' means invention 
or discovery."x 1 Allowing natural phenomena or laws of nature past 
the § l 0 I bar and denying them under § l 02( f) because they were 
not "invented" by the person who discovered them requires reading 
"discovers" out of the text of the Patent Act, just as the BPAI's 
approach in In re Bilski docs. 
Accordingly, to avoid reading "discovers" out of the statutory 
text, "new" must mean something more than merely "apply §§ l 02 
and 103." Thus, natural phenomena and laws of nature can be 
77. 596 f.2d 952, 960-61 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (citing In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 
1401 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). 
71\. !d. ("To provide the option of making such a rejection under either§ 101 or§ 102 
is contl1sing and therd(,re bad law. . 'The word 'new' in § 101 is defined and is to be 
construed in accordance with the provisions of § I 02. "' (quoting Rezqstrom, 427 F.2d at 
1401)). 
79. Id. 
RO. 35 U.S.C. § I 02 (2006 ); see also In re Sarkar, 581\ F.2d 1330, 1333 (C.C.P.A. 
1971\) ("Sets of steps conducted entirely by nature are not subject to patenting; they are not 
invented by man."). 
81. 35 u.s.c. § 100 (2006). 
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excluded from patentability under § l 0 l because a person cannot 
"invent or discover" a "new" natural phenomenon or law of nature, 
each of which has always existed by definition. x2 This approach reads 
the term "new" in § l 0 l to mean something more than just §§ l 02 
and l 03. 
Although the Court did not attempt to provide any of the 
preceding clarification in the Funk Bros. opinion, the case can be 
seen as further solidifYing the fact that natural phenomena and laws 
of nature are not patentable subject matter according to the Supreme 
Court. Furthermore, Funk Bros. can be interpreted as a preliminary 
application of the term "new" to natural phenomena and laws of 
nature under the text of§ l 0 l. 
The Supreme Court again took up the question of patent 
eligibility in Gottschalk v. Benson.x3 In Benson, the invention at issue 
was "a method for converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) 
numerals into pure binary numerals .... [which] purported to cover 
any use of the claimed method in a general-purpose digital computer 
of any type. "M In determining "whether the method described and 
claimed is a 'process' within the meaning of the Patent Act,"xs the 
Court t(mnd the following: 
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in 
practical cftcct that would be the result if the t(mnula t()r 
converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were 
patented in this case. The mathematical t(mnula involved 
here has no substantial practical application except in 
connection with a digital computer, which means that if the 
judgment below [i.e., that the patent was valid] is affirmed, 
the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical t(mnula 
and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm 
itself.x6 
The Court also opined that "[p ]henomena of nature, though 
just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts 
are not patentable, as they arc the basic tools of scientific and 
82. rt; however, the inventor discovers and claims a new and nonobvious way to .1pply 
the natural phenomenon, the claim may be patentable, as the last sentence of the Funk Rro.c 
quotation herein suggests. See sup1·a text accompanying note 74. 
83. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
84. Id. at 64. 
85. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2006)). 
86. Id. at 71-72. 
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technological work. "x7 Apparently this view is based on policy rather 
than on the text of § l 0 l. The Court did not clearly explain how 
"abstract intellectual concepts" arc "the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work" in the way that phenomena of nature are. 
Furthermore, it is unclear why the tact that the exceptions to § l 01 
constitute "the basic tools of scientific and technological work" 
should render them ineligible. Many, if not all, inventions that are 
att<:)rded patents arc also "tools of scientific and technological work," 
yet patents arc not denied based on the same reasoning. 
Although the Benson Court was concerned with policy 
considerations involving the patentability of computer programs, it 
opined that these considerations are best left to Congress to sort 
out.xx Based on this analysis, the Court held that the claim at issue 
was not directed to eligible subject matter under § l 0 l. X<! 
The next major Supreme Court case on point was Parker v. 
Flook.'Jo In Flook, the claim at issue involved a "method of updating 
alarm limits," generally useful in a catalytic conversion proccss.91 The 
Court summarized the claim thus: 
In essence, the method consists of three steps: the initial step 
which merely measures the present value of the process 
variable (e.g., the temperature); an intermediate step which 
uses an algorithm to calculate an updated alarm-limit value; 
and a final step in which the actual alarm limit is adjusted to 
the updated value. 02 
After noting that the inquiry was a difficult one,93 the Court 
nonetheless concluded that "it is absolutely clear that respondent's 
87. !d. at 67. 
88. !d. at 72-73. Note, however, that the Court's own reasons ti>r why the exceptions 
are excluded trom patentability under§ 101 are based on policy. Thus, the Court contradicts 
its own reasoning by asserting that policy is a consideration best left to Congress. 
89. !d. at 71-73. 
90. 437 U.S. S84 ( 1978). 
91. !d. at 58S-87. 
92. !d. at 585 (ti)()tnotcs omitted). 
93. !d. at 589 ("The line between a patentable 'process' and an unpatentable 'principle' 
is not always clear. Both are 'conception[ s I of the mind, seen only by r their l eHccts when 
being executed or pertimned.'" (alteration in original) (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 
707,728 (1880))). 
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application contains no claim of patentable invention ,m because the 
only real point of novelty was the algorithm.% 
The Court in Flook seems confused in attempting to determine 
whether eligible subject matter existed under § l 0 l. The analysis 
includes the premise that "the novelty of the mathematical algorithm 
is not a determining factor at all," yet the Court proceeds to state 
that the algorithm "is treated as though it were a familiar part of the 
prior art. "06 The Flook Court based its analysis on this point on 
(YReilly.~7 However, the subject matter eligibility inquiry under 
§ 10 l should not take into account prior art in the manner the 
Court did in Flook; rather, the prior art should be lett to an analysis 
under§§ 102 and l03.~x The Court recognized this LKt itselfwhen 
it stated: "The obligation to determine what type of discovery is 
sought to be patented must precede the determination of whether 
that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious. "~9 Yet the Court does not 
follow its own advice. Instead, the Court appears to resolve the 
§ 101 issue by first assuming that each clement of the claim was in 
the prior art, and then asking if the claim as a whole covered eligible 
subject matter. 100 Assuming that clements arc in the prior art and 
subsequently asking whether the combination is patentable is an 
inquiry that more appropriately t:11ls within the purview of 
obviousness under § l 03. 
The respondent in Flook noted the "import[ ation] into § l 0 l the 
considerations of 'inventiveness' which arc the proper concerns of 
§§ 102 and l 03," and the Court responded that "[ t ]his argument 
94. Id. at 594. 
95. Id. at 595. 
96. /d.at591-92. 
97. Id. at 592. 
98. Rather than assume that the algorithm was a bmiliar part of the prior art, it is more 
logical to assume that the algorithm is novel and nonobvious, so as to an.1lyze § I 01 issues 
independently of§§ 102 and 103 issues. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 213 ( 1981) 
(Stevens,)., dissenting) ("In the§ 101 analysis, we must assume that the sequence of steps in 
this programming method is novel, unolwious, and useful. The threshold question of whether 
such a method is patentable subject matter remains."). 
99. Flook, 437 U.S. at 593. 
100. See id. at 594-95 (tc>otnotc omitted) ("The chemical processes involved in cat.1lytic 
conversion of hydrocarbons are well known, as ,1re the practice of monitoring the chemical 
process variables, the use of alarm limits to trigger alarms, the notion that alarm limit values 
must be recomputed and readjusted, and the use of computers t(>r 'automatic 
monitoring-alarming.' Respondent's application simply provides a new and presumably better 
method t(>r calculating alarm limit values."). 
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was based on two misconceptions." 101 First, the Court alleged that 
"respondent incorrectly assumes that if a process application 
implements a principle in some specific fashion, it automatically falls 
within the patentable subject matter of § l 0 I and the substantive 
patentability of the particular process can then be determined by the 
conditions of§§ I02 and I03." 102 Second, the Flook Court posited 
that the respondent was wrong in challenging the Court's analysis 
because it violates "the view that a patent claim must be considered 
as a whole. " 103 However, the Court's analysis of the respondent's 
two alleged misconceptions is itself misconceived because it fails to 
separate eligibility under § I 01 and novelty and obviousness under 
§§ 102 and I03. 
Attcr alleging the first misconception, the Court in Flook 
explained that laws of nature are not patent eligible simply because 
"they arc not the kind of 'discoveries' that the statute was enacted to 
protect." 104 In support of this conclusion, the Court noted that 
"[ t ]he underlying notion is that a scientific principle, such as that 
expressed in respondent's algorithm, reveals a relationship that has 
always existed."ws This series of statements in Flook denied that 
novelty is taken into account under § l 0 I but then contradictorily 
asserted that laws of nature are not patentable based on the fact that 
the principle "has always existed. " 106 These statements demonstrate 
the Court's confusion in sorting out eligibility under § I 01 and 
novelty and obviousness under §§ I 02 and I 03. 
After alleging the second misconception, the Court asserted that 
the "[ r ]espondent's process is unpatentable under § l 01, not 
because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but 
because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, 
the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable 
invention. " 107 The Court reasoned further that "the discovery of 
such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some 
other inventive concept in its application. " 10x However, this statement 
101. !d . . lt 592 (li>otnote omitted). 
102. !d. at 593. The Court apparently thinks that "specific fashion" is too broad. 
103. !d. at 594. 
104. !d. 
105. !d. at n.15. 
106. !d. at 594. 
107. !d. 
108. !d. (emphasis added). 
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appears to base eligibility under § l 0 l on "inventiveness," which 
more properly falls under §§ l 02 and l 03, just as the respondent 
argued in the case. 10'J 
Despite the shortcomings and contradictions in the Flook 
decision, courts have relied on Flook's reasoning in later cases as a 
basis for rejecting patent claims f()r falling within the "abstract idea" 
category of ineligible subject matter. 110 The Flook decision also stands 
for the proposition that, even when a claim passes the "machinc-or-
transf(lrmation" test because a machine is involved, the usc of the 
machine docs not ensure the patentability of the claim if it 
constitutes merely insignificant "post-solution activity." 111 
In Diamond v. Diehr, the Court looked at much of the 
precedent reviewed above, restated the principle that "[ e ]xcluded 
from such patent protection arc laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas," and concluded that "[the Court's] recent 
holdings in Gottshalk v. Benson, and Parker v. Flook, both of which 
arc computer-related, stand f(lr no more than these long-established 
principles. " 112 The claim at issue in Diehr involved a process that 
used an equation (Arrhenius' equation) to operate "a rubber-
molding press for precision molded compounds with the aid of a 
digital computer. " 113 Although the claim involved an equation, the 
Court found the process patentable. The Court explained, 
"Arrhenius' equation is not patentable in isolation, but when a 
process f{lr curing rubber is devised which incorporates in it a more 
dlicient solution of the equation, that process is at the very least not 
barred at the threshold by § I 0 l." 114 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens concluded that the majority "t:1il[ s] 
to recognize the critical difference between the 'discovery' 
requirement in § 101 and the 'novelty' requirement in § l02."m 
However, this is one decision that appears to keep the issues of 
109. Sec id. at 592. 
110. Sec, eg., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (20 I 0); In Rc Comiskey, 554 ~.3d 
967, 977-78 (red. Cir. 2009); Ex parte Volcani, No. 2009-004790, 2010 WL 4112612, at 
*4 (R.P.A.I. Oct. 18, 2010). 
111. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 590. Later cases reti:r to this as "extra-solution activity," 
which clarities that the timing of the activity is not important in determining whether it adds a 
significant limitation to the claim. E,q., In re Bilski, 545 ~.3d 943,963 (2008). 
112. 450 U.S. 175,185 (1981) (citations omitted). 
113. Id.at179n.5. 
114. !d. at 188. 
115. !d. at 211 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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§ 101 eligibility and § 102 novelty straight; it spends several pages 
describing the differences between the two statutes, and then 
properly ignores novelty to determine cligibility. 116 The basis for the 
Court's holding of eligibility under§ 101 appears to be something 
akin to a straightf()fward application of the "machine-or-
transf(mnation" test: because the claimed process transf(xmcd an 
article (rubber) to solve "a practical problcm," 117 it was directed to 
eligible subject matter under § 101. 
C. Summary of the Historical Cases 
These historical cases and many others establish that "natural 
phenomena, laws of nature, and abstract ideas" are categories of 
ineligible subject matter, but none of the Supreme Court precedent 
appears to adequately justifY the exclusion of an "abstract idea" from 
eligible subject matter. Natural phenomena and laws of nature are 
exempt from patenting under § 101 because they are "the basic tools 
of scientific and technological work" 11 x and because they cannot be a 
"new" thing invented or discovcred. 119 However, "abstract ideas" do 
not tit the same mold because they can be "new," and thus arc not 
as clearly excluded from the text of the Patent Act as the other two 
categories. furthermore, the decisions discussed above each assume 
that "abstract idea" is an established exception to eligible subject 
matter without explaining whether the Court had authority to 
institute the exception in the first place and without establishing a 
clear basis f()r the exception. These shortcomings often cause the 
Court to base its opinions on confused and faulty reasoning. 
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE BILSKI V. KAPPOS OPINION 
The Bilski opinion docs not add much clarity to an 
understanding of eligible subject matter and the limits of§ 101. The 
Court in Bilski applied the same amorphous reasoning as previous 
cases to conclude that the invention at issue was an abstract idea and 
therefore not patentable. 1211 Much like the historical cases outlined 
116. Id.atiR9-91. 
117. /d.at!Rl. 
118. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,67 (1972). 
119. 35 u.s.c:. § 101 (2006). 
120. Ironically, the Court's appliution of the abstract idea exception to ]Htentability is 
abstract in itself. 
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above, the Bilski opinion never provides a reasoned explanation why 
an "abstract idea" constitutes ineligible subject matter, yet it 
concludes that the invention at issue is an abstract idea and therefore 
unpatentable. This flaw in the Court's opinion essentially leaves the 
test f(>r patentability as the unsatisfactory "you know it when you sec 
it" test. 121 
A. The Patent Application in Bilski 
Bernard L. Bilski and l~"tnd A. Warsaw claimed a method of 
hedging risk in commodity trading in the energy markct. 122 The 
Court in Bilksi v. Kappos t(mnd that claims l and 4 were "[ t ]he key 
claims." 123 Claim l, in its entirety, recites: 
A method tor managing the consumption risk costs of a 
commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price 
comprising the steps of: 
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity 
provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said 
consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based 
upon historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a 
risk position of said consumer; 
(b) identifYing market participants for said commodity having 
a counter~risk position to said consumers; and 
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity 
provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate 
such that said series of market participant transactions 
balances the risk position of said sencs of consumer 
transactions. 124 
121. In the lower opinion at the BPAI, the Board noted that "It Jhc USI'TO is strug;gling 
to identity some way to objectively analyze the statutory subject matter issue instead of just 
saying 'We know it when we see it."' Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 573R364, ,lt 
*4 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006). Unti>rtunatcly, as discussed below, the Supreme Court did little 
if anything to provide the increased objectivity f(>r which the Board yearned. 
122. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,3223-24 (2010). 
123. Id. at 3223. 
124. Brieff(>r Petitionns at 7, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. OR-964). 
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Claim 4, in its entirety, recites: 
A method f(x managing weather-related energy price risk costs sold 
by an energy provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of: 
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said energy provider 
and energy consumers wherein said energy consumers purchase 
energy at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate 
corresponding to a risk position of said consumers, wherein the 
fixed price t(x the consumer transaction is determined by the 
relationship: 
fixed Bill Price= f, + I(C, + T, + LD,) x (a+ gE (W1))1 
Wherein, 
r, = fixed costs in period i; 
C, =variable costs in period i; 
T, = variable long distance transportation costs in period i; 
LD, = variable local delivery cost in period i; 
E(W
1
) = estimated location-specific weather indicator in period t; 
and 
a and g arc constants; 
(b) identifYing other energy market participants having a counter-
risk position to said consumers; and 
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said energy provider 
and said other energy market participants at a second fixed rate 
such that said series of transactions balances the risk position of said 
series of consumer transactions. 125 
Stated simply, claim 4 "is similar to claim 1 except that it specifies 
precisely how the fixed price for an energy consumer transaction is 
determined using a mathematical formula." 126 In summary, the 
independent claims of the patent application cover "a procedure for 
instructing buyers and sellers how to protect against the risk of price 
fluctuations in a discrete section of the economy. " 127 The dependent 
claims "explain how claims l and 4 can be applied to allow energy 
125. !d. ,n X. 
126. Jd.at7. 
127. Rilski, 130 S. Ct. <ll 3223. 
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suppliers and consumers to minimize the risks resulting trom 
t1uctuations in market demand tor energy." 12x 
B. Procedural History ~~fBilski 
The patent application was rejected by the patent examiner 
under § I 0 l because the claimed invention was "not implemented 
on a specitlc apparatus and merely manipulates [an] abstract idea and 
solves a purely mathematical problem without any limitation to a 
practical application, therefore, the invention is not directed to the 
technological arts." 12l) The applicants appealed the examiner's 
decision to the BPAI, which sustained the rejection of Bilski's patent 
application because the claims included no transfl:m11ation of an 
article, were directed to an abstract idea, and had no useful, 
concrete, and tangible result. 130 The applicants next appealed to the 
Federal Circuit, where the majority rejected the application as tailing 
the "machine-or-transformation" test, which it held was the sole test 
for subject matter eligibility under § l 01. 131 
Although nine out of the twelve judges that heard the case at the 
Federal Circuit agreed on the outcome, the court produced tlve 
separate opinions. 132 Eight judges joined Chief Judge Michel in his 
opinion f(>r the court. 133 Two of those judges134 tiled a concurring 
opinion "to respond to the claim in the two dissents that the 
majority's opinion is not grounded in the statute, but rather 'usurps 
the legislative role.'" 135 Finally, three dissenting opinions were tiled 
by Judge Newman, Judge Mayer, and Judge Rader, respectively. The 
array of opinions among judges who deal with questions of 
patentability on a regular basis highlights the difficulty in applying 
§101. 
The majority of the Federal Circuit asked "whether [the] 
Applicants' claim recites a fundamental principle and, if so, whether 
128. Id. at 3224. 
129. Id. (citations omitted). 
130. Ex parte Bilski, 2006 Wl. 5738364, at * 18-*22 (B.P.A.l. Mar. 8, 2006 ). 
131. In rc Bilski, 545 F.3d 943,966 (hd. Cir. 2008). 
132. The Supreme Court stated that "Is ]tudents of t'atent law would he well advised to 
study these scholarly opinions." Ri!Jki, 130 S. Ct. at 3224. 
133. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949. The judges t<>r the majoritv opinion were: Michel, 
Lourie, Schall, Bryson, (;ajarsa, Linn, Dyk, Prost, and Moore. 
134. Id. Judge Dyk was joined by Judge Linn in his concurring; opinion. 
135. I d. at 966. 
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it would preempt substantially all uses of that fundamental principle 
if allowed." 136 Although the question was stated simply, the court 
noted that "this inquiry is hardly straightforward." 137 The court then 
analyzed Supreme Court precedent and concluded that the 
"machin<>or-transf(>nnation" test was the sole test for the 
patentability of processes under § l 0 1. 13x The court restated the 
"machine-or-transf(>rmation" test as follows: "A claimed process is 
surely patent-eligible under § l 01 if: ( 1) it is tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus, or ( 2) it transforms a particular article into a 
different state or thing. " 139 Because Bilski's claims failed the 
"machine-or-transt<:m1ution" test, the court held that they 
constituted ineligible subject matter under § l 0 l. 
Among the non-majority opinions, Judge Rader's dissent is 
notable because the Supreme Court later arrived at the same 
conclusion and even quoted Judge Rader in its opinion. 140 Judge 
Rader's dissent points out flaws in the majority's analysis and 
concludes simply that "Bilski attempts to patent an abstract idea." 141 
However, Judge Rader's opinion focused mostly on why the 
majority applied the wrong standard; the opinion did not attempt to 
establish a reasoned basis for the "abstract idea" exception or to 
clarity why Bilski's claims should fall within that category. 
C. The U.S. Supreme Court)s Opinion in Bilski 
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the "machine-or-
transf(mnation" test "is not the sole test for deciding whether an 
invention is a patent-eligible 'process."' 142 The Court explained that 
the "machine-or-transformation" test violates the statutory 
construction rule that "words will be interpreted as taking their 
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." 143 Any deviation trom 
f(>llowing the ordinary meaning of terms in the Court's precedent 
"has only been ... f(x the exceptions f(>r laws of nature, physical 
136. !d. at 954. 
137. !d. 
138. Id. at 956 ("[T]he machine-or-transt(>rmation test, properly applied, is the 
governing test t(>r determining patent eligibility of a process under § I 0 I."). 
139. !d. at 954 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,70 (1972)). 
140. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,3231 (2010). 
141. In re Bilski, S4S F.3d at lOIS (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader,}., dissenting). 
142. Ril.rki, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. 
143. Id. at 3226 (citing Diamond v. Diehr,4SO U.S. 175,182 (1981)). 
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phenomena, and abstract ideas." 144 Based on this premise, the Court 
was "unaware of any 'ordinary, contemporary, common meaning' of 
the definitional terms 'process, art or method' that would require 
these terms to be tied to a machine or to transfl:m11 an article." 145 
Although the Court discounted the exclusivity of the "machine-or-
transformation" test, it did note that the test "is a useful and 
important clue, an investigative tool, t()r determining whether some 
claimed inventions are processes under § 101." 146 At least f(mr 
justices147 were uncomfortable with a result that would likely prohibit 
patents in software and other "Information Age" industries. 14x 
However, these f(mr justices stated that the "machine-or-
transf(xmation" test "may well provide a suflicient basis t()r 
evaluating processes similar to those in the Industrial Age-tc)r 
example, inventions grounded in a physical or other tangible 
torm." 149 
After disposing of the exclusivity of the "machine-or-
transformation" test, the Court discounted the categorical exclusion 
of business method patents. 150 finally, the Court "resolve[ d] this 
case narrowly on the basis of[ the] Court's decisions in Benson, Flook, 
and Diehr, which show that petitioners' claims arc not patentable 
processes because they are attempts to patent abstract ideas." 151 After 
a brief review of these cases, the Court f(>Lmd summarily that "it is 
clear that [the] petitioners' application is not a patentable 'process.' 
Claims 1 and 4 . . . explain the basic concept of hedging, or 
protecting against risk: 'Hedging is a fundamental economic practice 
long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any 
introductory finance class."' 152 In further support of its finding, the 
Court stated that "[ t ]hesc claims attempt to patent the usc of the 
abstract idea of hedging risk in the energy market and then instruct 
144. Id. 
14S. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
146. Id. at 3227. 
147. justices Kennedy, Roberts, Thomas, and Alito joined this P'lrt (II) of the opinion. 
justice Scalia, who joined other parts of the opinion of the Court, joined the concurrence of 
justice Breyer as to this part (II). !d. at 3223. 
148. See id. at 3227-28. 
149. Id. at 3228. 
!50. Id. at 3228-29. 
!51. !d. at 3229-30. 
152. Id. at 3231 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (h:d. Cir. 2008) (R.lckr, )., 
dissenting)). 
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the usc of well-known random analysis techniques to help establish 
some of the inputs into the cquation." 153 Although it held that the 
claims at issue were "abstract ideas," the Court expressly declined to 
add any clarifYing definitions to the analysis. 154 
The opinions of the justices were split on several issues, including 
the subject matter eligibility of business methods, but the Court 
unanimously agreed that the "machine-or-transformation" test was 
not the sole test f(x eligibility under § l 0 l and that the Bilski claims 
were directed to ineligible, abstract ideas. 155 
Although J usticc Stevens agreed that the Bilski claims should not 
be patented because they cover abstract ideas, he concurred because 
he was interested in precluding the eligibility of "business methods," 
as wcll. 15(' In his analysis, Justice Stevens points out flaws in the 
Court's opinion, 157 including "the fact that hedging is 'long 
prevalent in our system of commerce' cannot justifY the Court's 
conclusion, as 'the proper construction of§ l 01 ... docs not involve 
the familiar issu[c] of novelty' that arises under§ l02." 15x He also 
notes that "[ t ]he Court ... never provides a satisfYing account of 
what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea." 15<J However, once he 
tears down the majority's reasoning, he docs little or nothing to 
supplant it. Although he agrees that Bilski's claims were directed to 
abstract ideas, he of1ers no definition, clarification, or justification for 
the categorical exception of "abstract ideas." 
V. THE AfTERMATH 
1n sum, it appears that the Supreme Court has left the door open 
enough to allow for patents in the Information Age, yet closed 
enough to exclude subject matter for ideas that arc too "abstract," 
I S3. !d. at 3231. 
IS4. !d. ("The patent application here can be rejected under our precedents on the 
unpatent,Jbility of abstract ideas. The Court, thereti>re, need not detine further what 
constitutes a patentable 'process,' beyond pointing to the definition of that term provided in § 
I 00( b) and looking to the guideposts in Henson, Flook, and Diehr. "). 
I S5. !d. at 3223. 
I S6. !d. at 3232 ("The wiser course would have been to hold that petitioners' method is 
not a 'process' beGluse it describes only a general method of engaging in business 
transactions-and business methods arc not patentable."). 
I S7. Sec, CJf., id. at 3234-36. 
158. !d. at 3236 (citations omitted) (imernal quotation marks omitted). 
IS9. !d. 
1247 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
whatever that term means. The line between the two remains very 
fuzzy and subject to manipulation by the courts. If a court thinks 
that a particular process should be patentable, then it can simply say 
that it is more like Diehr than Benson or Flook. If a court does not 
think a process should be patented, then it can likewise say that the 
process is more like that of Benson or Flook than Diehr, and 
summarily hold that the claim merely covers an ineligible abstract 
idea. Thus, we arc left with a "you-know-it-when-you-sec-it" analysis 
that is subject to the whims and preconceived notions of the 
judiciary. 160 
A. The Industrfs ReJponse to Bilski 
Many players in the technological industry arc displeased with 
the lack of clarity in the Supreme Court's Bilski decision. for 
example, the Computer and Communications Industry 
Association 161 issued a statement criticizing the opinion. 162 The 
CCIA stated, in part: "The majority's decision exacerbates the 
uncertainty that characterizes the IP system today. It will give no 
notice to the public about when ordinary business practices can lead 
to ruinous liability. Businesses will be t(xced to navigate an 
increasing abstract patent minefield, raising business uncertainty and 
legal costs." 163 The CCIA also observed: 
By concluding that the hedging technique was no more than 
an abstract idea, the court breathes new life into the abstract 
idea exclusion, but docs not otTer new guidance on just what 
that is. The opinion is fairly clear about what it isn't doing. It 
is not clear about what it is doing. 
By declining to give tlxcd meaning to terms like 'process' and 
'business method,' the Court has recreated at a systemic level 
160. The Roard of Patent Appeals and Interferences has mirrored this conclusion in c1ses 
since Bilski; the opinions seem to tdlow a limn consisting; of the tdlowing; steps: ( 1) apply the 
"machine-or-transtimnation" test; (2) continue the analysis by comparing; the invention to 
Benson, Flook, and/or Diehr; and ( 3) hold that the claim is dig;iblc under § 1 01 or not, as the 
case may be. See, C.J!., Hx parte Caccavale, 2010 WL 2901727 ( B.l'.A.I. 201 0); Ex ptrrtc Hwer, 
2010 WL 3072973 (B.P.A.I. 2010); Hx parte Ull~ 2010 WL 3611779 (B.P.A.I. 2010); Hx 
parte Volcani, 2010 WL 4112612 ( B.l'.A.l. 2010). 
161. Hereinafter "the CC1A." 
162. CCIA, Supreme Court Compounds Uncertainty.fiJr Rusiness Method Patents, june 28, 
20 l 0, http:/ /www.ccianct.org;/index .asp?sid~5&artid~ 171 &evttlg;~l:'alse. 
163. !d. 
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the problem of fuzzy and uncertain boundaries that have 
plagued patents in abstract areas and made it both risky and 
costly to assert, avoid, or defend against patents. 164 
Similarly, an author of the popular patent law blog, Patently-0, 
observed: "In general, the opinion of1crs no clarity or aid for those 
tasked with determining whether a particular invention falls within 
Section l 0 l . ... It is unclear to me how patent oHicc examiners will 
be able to apply the test for abstract ideas in any meaningful way." 165 
Other commentators have concluded that, although the 
Supreme Court was not very clear as to the standard to be applied, 
the decision was beneficial to the economy in that it did not bar 
business method patents in gcneral. 166 In essence, comments like 
these could be summed up as "it could have been worse." 
The party that will likely be most aflccted by the Bilski decision is 
the United States Patent and Trademark Ofticc (USPTO). After the 
Bilski opinion issued, the Patent Office published Interim Guidance 
in the federal Register that outlines how subject matter eligibility is 
to be examined in view of Bilski. 167 The Interim Guidance 
reestablishes the importance of the "machine-or-transformation" 
test, yet adds that it is not the end -all in the analysis of§ 101 in light 
of Bilski. 16x The 1 ntcrim Guidance "presents [non-exclusive] factors 
that arc to be considered when evaluating patent-eligibility of 
method claims. The factors include inquiries from the machine-or-
transf(xmation test ... and inquiries gleaned from Supreme Court 
precedent. " 1(''! The f1etors include: 
164. !d. 
165. Ri!Jki l'. Kappos, l'ATFNTLY-0 (June 28, 2010, 10:00 AM), http:// 
www. patently<>. C< >111 / patcnt/2 0 I 0/06 /bi !ski-v- kapp< >s- business-methods-< >ut -s< >liware-still-
patentablc.html. 
166. Sa, ec~:r., Kim Leonard, Supreme Court Rulin._q May Strengthen InnOJ'trtion in U.S., 
l'ITTSBliK(;I! TR!Bl'NI:-REVIEW (June 29, 2010), http:/ jwww.pittsburghlive.com/ 
xjpittsburghtrib/busincss/s_6881 0 l.html; but ;u Michael Barclay, Rilski l'. Kappos: 'Jhe 
Supreme C11urt Declines t11 Prohibit Rusines.r Meth11d Ptrtent.r, ELEC. FRONTEIK FOUND. (Jun. 
29, 20 I 0 ), http:/ /www.dY.org/decplinks/20 I 0/06/bilski-v-kappos-supreme-court-declincs-
prohibit ("rTJhe U.S. Supreme Court finally issued a ruling in Rilski v. Kappos, a business 
method patent c,1sc that, many hoped, would give the Court an opportunity to sharply limit 
these much maligned patents, or at least otter clear guidance on how business method patents 
are to be judged in the tl1ture. Unlc>rrunatdy, the Court did neither one."). 
167. Interim (;uidance t(Jr Determining Subject Matter Eligibility lc>r Process Claims in 
View of Bilski Y. Kappos, 75 hd. Reg. 43,922 (July 27, 2010) rhcreinafter Interim Guidance]. 
168. !d. at 43,924. 
169. !d. 
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[ l] Whether the method involves or IS executed by a 
particular machine or apparatus; 
[ 2] Whether perf(mnance of the claimed method results in 
or otherwise involves a transf(>rmation of a particular article; 
[ 3] Whether perf(mnancc of the claimed method involves 
an application of a law of nature ... ; 
[ 4] Whether a general concept ... is involved in executing 
the steps of the mcthod. 170 
Each of these general factors is broken down into more specific 
inquiries to assist the examiner in the analysis. 171 It is unclear as of 
yet how much the Interim Guidelines have helped or hindered in the 
eligible subject matter inquiry of§ l 0 l. 
B. Case Law Applying the Bilski Decision 
Since the Bilski v. Kappos opinion issued, some lower courts have 
already issued opinions that show the courts arc just as confused as 
ever when analyzing claims under § l 0 l. For example, the U nitcd 
States Central District Court of Califcm1ia in Ultramercial v. Hulu 
applied the analysis of Bilski to a patent involving "an invention fc>r 
distributing copyrighted products over the Internet (or other 
networks )," 172 while recognizing that the Bilski decision left 
unanswered questions. 173 After the court in Ultramercial f(>Lmd that 
the claim at issue failed the "machinc-or-transf(mnation" tcst, 174 it 
moved on to decide whether the claim constituted an "abstract idea" 
in light of Bilski. 175 In so doing, the district court held: 
This core principle, similar to the core of the Bilski patent, is 
an abstract idea. Indeed, public television channels have used 
the same basic idea fc>r years to provide free (or oftsct the 
170. !d. at 43,925. 
171. Id. 
172. Ultramcrcial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 2010 WL 336009R, at *I (C.D. C1l. Aug. 13, 
2010). 
173. Id. at *3 ("Yet the Supreme Court did not olkr an oample of an invention that 
would not be tied to a machine or transtimn an article and still p.1ss the subject m.1ttcr test."). 
174. !d. at *S. 
17S. Id. at *6. 
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cost of) media to their viewers. At its heart, therefore, the 
patent docs no more than disclose an abstract idea. 176 
Although the court recognized in a f(x>tnote that there is a 
difference between novelty and subject matter eligibility, 177 it fell 
victim to the same pitf~1lls of the Supreme Court in Bilski. The 
Ultramercial holding is simply this: because the idea of media 
advertising has been in usc for years, it must be an abstract idea. This 
reasoning is flawed because it bases the abstractness of the claims on 
notions of novelty. Ultramercial demonstrates that the Bilski 
opinion did not give much guidance to lower courts applying § 10 l. 
In December 20 l 0, the ~cdcral Circuit issued an opinion 
regarding the patent eligibility of another process in R_esearch Corp. 
v. Microsoft, reestablishing the wide breadth of§ lOI.m The lower 
court f(mnd that two of the six patents covering "digital image 
halftoning" were invalid under § I 01.17') In Research Corp., the 
~cderal Circuit observed that " [ t ]he Supreme Court recently 
reemphasized [in Bilski] the significance of[§ 101 's] broad statutory 
categories" by noting § I 0 I 's double use of the word "any" 
preceding the listing of categories. 1xo The ~ederal Circuit also recited 
language from precedent, noting that "the Supreme Court has 'more 
than once cautioned that courts should not read into the patent laws 
limitations and conditions which the legislature has not 
cxprcsscd."' 1x1 The Federal Circuit attempted to explain the basis for 
the three "exceptions" to eligible subject matter, stating that 
laws of nature and natural phenomena fall outside the 
statutory categories because those categories embrace the 
"basic tools of scientific and technological work." 
Abstractness, also a disclosure problem addressed in the 
176. !d. 
177. !d. at *6 n.6. 
178. Rese.1rch Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
179. !d. at 862. Note that the district court's ruling came bdc>re the Supreme Court's 
Rilski decision. The district court's analysis relied on the Federal Circuit's opinion in In rc 
Rilski th.lt the "machine-or-transt(mnation" test was dispositive t(>r process claims. The district 
court t(nmd that the claims of the two pcltents t:liled the "machine-or-transt(>rmation" test. See 
Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 2009 WL 2413623, at *6-10 (D. Ariz. July 28, 
2009). 
180. Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 867. 
181. !d. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981 )) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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Patent Act in section 112, also places subject matter outside 
the statutory catcgories. 1x2 
Here, the court offers no explanation (other than historical) as to 
why "abstract ideas" arc not eligible f(x patenting under § l 0 1, 
although it does note that some abstract ideas could be rejected 
under § 112 in addition to § l 0 l. The court again cautioned that 
the inquiries involved in§§ 102, 103, and 112 should not come into 
play in deciding whether a claim constitutes eligible subject matter 
under § 101, and asserted that "section 101 does not permit a court 
to reject subject matter categorically because it finds that a claim is 
not worthy of a patent." 1x3 
The court f(Jtmd that the subject matter of the claim at issue was 
clearly a "process," then moved on to analyze whether it was an 
"abstract idea." 1x4 The court expressly declined to define "abstract," 
yet it recognized that "this disqualifYing characteristic [abstractness] 
should exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the broad statutory 
categories of eligible subject matter and the statutory context that 
directs primary attention on the patentability criteria of the rest of 
the Patent Act." 1xs The court further clarified that "inventions with 
specific applications or improvements to technologies in the 
marketplace arc not likely to be so abstract that they override the 
statutory language and framework of the Patent Act." 1x6 The court 
also noted (apparently in dicta) that abstract ideas could create a 
potential § 112 problem, as well, because the abstract ideas "might 
also be so conceptual that the written description docs not enable a 
person of ordinary skill in the art to replicate the process. " 1x7 
With such a broad interpretation of eligible subject matter, the 
federal Circuit Court held that the two patents at issue pass the 
"coarse eligibility filter" of § 101. Ixx The Research Corp. case 
attempts to keep the subject matter eligibility bar low and the door 
182. Reiearch Corp., 627 ~.3d at 867-68 (quoting <_;ottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 
67(1972)). 
183. !d. at 868. 
184. !d. 
185. !d. 
186. I d. at 869. One wonders if, in tl1ture practice, the "machine-or-transtimnation" test 
will simply be replaced by the "Specific Applications or Improvements to Technologies in the 
Marketplace" test. Only time will tell. 
187. !d. 
188. Id. 
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wide open to all sorts of processes as long as the processes do not 
"override the broad statutory categories . . . and the statutory 
context that directs primary attention on the patentability criteria of 
the rest of the Patent Act." 1x<J Such strong language has likely 
"place[ d] a high hurdle in front of challengers who seek to invalidate 
process patents on the [abstract idea] ground. " 190 Perhaps the 
federal Circuit has also noted the problems associated with the 
category of "abstract idea" and wishes to minimize the application of 
this so-called "exception" to eligible subject matter. 
VI. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS Of "ABSTRACT 
IDEAS": THE "EXCLUSION" VIEW 
The analysis under § I 0 l would be somewhat clearer if the 
Supreme Court or Congress would adopt a uniform understanding 
of why "abstract ideas" arc not eligible for patenting under § 10 l. 
This Comment offers a perspective on "abstract idea" that would 
help courts and practitioners apply the view that abstract ideas arc 
ineligible su bjcct matter under § I 0 l. Specifically, this Comment 
suggests that the "exclusion" view rejected by the BPAI in Ex parte 
Lunt{qren should be adopted. 1<J 1 
This Comment has already shown that the exceptions of "natural 
phenomena" and "laws of nature" can be viewed as exclusions based 
on a proper interpretation of the term "new" in § 10 l. 1n Thercfc)re, 
they may be seen as categorical tools the courts use to decide if 
subject matter falls within the text of the statute rather than 
narrowing exceptions to the text of the statute. However, the reasons 
that "natural phenomena" and "laws of nature" are not eligible 
subject matter do not apply as cleanly to an "abstract idea." An 
abstract idea can be "new," or conceived and produced 
independently from what previously existed, unlike a natural 
phenomenon or a law of nature. Therefore, an "abstract idea" is 
liN. !d. at R68. 
190. jason Rantanen, Research Corp. v. Microsoft: Section /01 and Process Claims, 
PATEi':TLY-0 (Dec. R, 2010, 5:16 I'M), http:/ /www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/12/ 
research-corp-v-microsoh-section-1 0 1-and-process-claims.html. 
191. Ex parte Lundgren, No. 2003-20R8, 2004 WL 3561262, at *30-31 (B.P.A.l. Apr. 
20, 2004). 
192. See, e."q., discussion regarding Funk Bros., r:X parte Bilski, and In re Bo;_qy, supra Pc1rt 
III.B. 
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fundamentally ditlcrcnt from the other two categories of 
"exceptions" to eligible subject matter. 
Interpreted narrowly, "abstract idea" does not fall within any 
definition of "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter," and is therefore not an exception at all, but is merely a 
preclusion that results from the statutory language. In Ex parte 
Lundgren, the BPAI discussed whether the three "exceptions," as 
the Supreme Court calls them, should be thought of as "exceptions" 
or "exclusions." 1n If the three categories of ineligible subject matter 
are "exclusions," they "represent subject matter that is excluded by 
the terms of § 101."1\)4 In contrast, subject matter that is an 
"exception" includes subject matter that may tall within one of the 
statutory classes, 195 but is nonetheless unpatentable because of "some 
exceptional condition, i.e., [the courts] take out subject matter that 
would otherwise be included." l\16 The Board concluded that the 
three categories are best understood as exceptions.l\17 Under this 
view, the three categories of ineligible subject matter arc court-
imposed limitations to the text of § l 0 l. In contrast, if the three 
categories are viewed as "exclusions," then the analysis of the 
categories is a tool to determine whether subject matter is eligible 
according to the statutory text alone. Under the latter (i.e., 
"exclusion") view, even an abstract idea would be patent eligible 
under § 101, as long as it is a new and useful process. l<JX 
The petitioners in Bilski argued in their brief before the Supreme 
Court that a "practical application" rule should be applied to 
determine the patent eligibility of a claim involving an abstract idea, 
law of nature, or natural phenomenon. 1<J<J The petitiOners 
summarized the proposed rule t()r abstract ideas in this manner: 
"abstract ideas are not eligible ... because they arc not 'useful' and 
they must be applied to a practical usc bd(lrc they can be 
193. Hx parte Lund,qren, 2004 WL 3561262, at *30-31. 
194. Id.at*31. 
195. I.e., process, machine, manut;Kturc, or composition of m.ltter. 
196. Ex parte LundlJrcn, 2004 WL 3561262, at * 30. 
197. Id. at *31 (stating that the ineligible categories "refer to subject matter that would 
otherwise be within one of the categories of§ 101 "). 
198. Of course, the claim and patent application would still be examined substantively 
under other provisions ofthc statute, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, ,md 112. 
199. Rricfl(>r Petitioners at 42-43, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 321R (2010) (No. OR-
964). 
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patented. " 21111 In short, the petitioners argue that only ideas that are 
not "useful," as the term is used in § I 0 I, should be ineligible 
abstract ideas. The "practical application" standard argued tor by the 
Bilski petitioners appears to be more in line with the text of § 101 
than is the "exception" view. 
The federal Circuit adopted a similar standard in Research Corp., 
stating that a process will likely pass the "coarse filter" of§ 10 I if the 
process involves "specific applications or improvements to 
technologies in the marketplace. "201 This standard also narrows the 
applicability of the "abstract idea" exception only to cases where the 
abstract idea would "override the broad statutory categories ... and 
the statutory context that directs primary attention on the 
patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act. " 202 Under Research 
Corp., it appears that the federal Circuit agrees with the "exclusion" 
view, because the limits the court imposes on the eligibility of 
abstract ideas arc based on the "statutory context," not on a 
sweeping, categorical "exception" to the statute. 
As argued by the Bilski petitioner and as supported by the 
Research Corp. decision, the "abstract idea" preclusion should not be 
seen as a judicially-imposed "exception" to eligibility under § 10 I; 
rather, it should be seen as a tool the courts use to interpret the text 
of the statute, or, in other words, as an "exclusion. " 203 The 
"exception" view assumes that Congress meant for a broad category 
of processes to be patent-eligible and that the Court has legislated 
from the bench to add limitations to Congress's intended breadth. 
The "exclusion" view, on the other hand, assumes that the Court 
may usc the "abstract idea" concept as a tool to interpret the text of 
the statute without imposing extra-statutory limitations to the 
text. 2114 
While the "exception" view is based on the premise that the 
Court may add to or limit the statute, the "exclusion" view is based 
200. !d. at I4; see also id. at 4.3-44. 
20 I. Re.<earch Corp. Techs. !'. Micro.<oft Corp., 627 f . .3d 8S9, 869 (l'ed. Cir. 20 I 0). 
202. !d. at 868. 
20.3. The terms "exception" and "exclusion" are used in this paragraph as the Roard uses 
the terms in I.unf{qren, discussed supra note I80. 
204. This is precisely what the Supreme Court prescribed in llilski l'. Kappos, stating: 
"This Court has 'more than once cautioned that courts should not read into the patent laws 
limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed."' I30 S. Ct. 32I8, 3226 
(quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 4SO U.S. I7S, 182 ( 198I)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
I255 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
on the premise that the Court's role is to merely interpret and apply 
the text of the statute. Therefore, the three categories of patent 
ineligibility are best viewed merely as results of interpreting the text 
of the statute (i.e., the "exclusion" view is correct), and not as 
adding any more limitation than the statute inherently contains (as 
the "exception" view would). furthermore, the "exclusion" view fits 
with precedent stating that inventive practical applications of abstract 
ideas constitute eligible subject matter.205 
In summary, if an inventive process covers an abstract idea, then 
that invention should be analyzed under the text of the Patent Act, 
rather than be categorically denied under § 10 I, even if it is purely 
an idea. This would be more in line with the Supreme Court's vision 
of not "read[ ing] into the patent laws limitations and conditions 
which the legislature has not expressed. " 20<' Some "idea" claims may 
still be denied under § l 01 if they do not fall under one of the four 
categories of eligible subject matter, i.e., if they arc not put to 
practical usc. A greater portion of patent claims may pass this "coarse 
filter" than currently do, but some of these claims may still be 
rejected under other provisions of the Patent Act, particularly f(x 
violating § Il2's disclosure requirements. Using this analysis and 
understanding of "abstract ideas," courts, examiners, and patent 
applicants can apply § 10 l to process claims in a more 
constitutionally sound manner amid the growth of the Int()rmation 
Age. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Over 150 years of Supreme Court precedent has established that 
"abstract ideas" are not eligible subject matter t()r patents. Despite 
this long history, patent applicants, examiners, and the courts 
themselves appear to be just as confused as ever in applying the 
standards for subject matter eligibility to borderline process claims. 
The courts have never provided a clear justification t()r the 
categorical prohibition of patents for "abstract ideas." 
To better understand the eligibility of process claims under 
§ I 01, the "abstract idea" category of ineligible subject matter 
should be seen as an "exclusion" based on the text of the statute 
205. ElJ., Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) !56, 175 ( IR52); (;onschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63,71-72 (1972). 
206. Rilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at I R2 ). 
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rather than as a judicially-imposed "exception" to the statute. If 
courts and practitioners adopt the "exclusion" view of "abstract 
ideas," as proposed, they will have a better understanding of the 
subject matter eligibility of process claims under § I 0 l. 
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